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The Subprime crisis resulted from the interplay of 
information asymmetry and control problems with 
failures to internalize systemic risk and recognize the 
implications of Knightian uncertainty. A successful 
reform of prudential regulation will thus need to 
integrate more harmoniously the three paradigms of 
agency, externalities, and mood swings. This is a tall 
order because each paradigm has different and often 
inconsistent regulatory implications. Moreover, efforts 
to address problems under one paradigm can exacerbate 
problems under the others. To avoid regulatory arbitrage 
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and ensure that externalities are uniformly internalized, 
prudentially regulated intermediaries should be 
subjected to the same capital adequacy requirements 
and unregulated intermediaries should be financed only 
by regulated intermediaries. Reflecting the importance 
of uncertainty and mood swings, the new regulatory 
architecture will also need to rely less on spontaneous 
market discipline and more on “holistic” supervision, and 
incorporate countercyclical norms that can be adjusted in 
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1. Introduction 
 
As in the case of the other two large financial crises in modern U.S. history, the 
Great Depression and the Savings & Loan (S&L) crisis, the Subprime crisis was triggered 
by the inability of financial intermediaries to withstand large macroeconomic price 
volatility.
1 In the Great Depression, banks started failing when the stock market crash 
induced losses on their equity investments or the loans they had given to investors towards 
the purchase of stocks. In the S&L crisis, the main trigger was the rise in deposit rates that 
accompanied the increase in inflation of the late 1970s and the subsequent, sharp 
tightening of monetary policy. For the Subprime crisis, the trigger was the decline in 
housing prices. In all three cases, the crisis resulted from a rapidly rising wedge between 
the underlying value of financial intermediaries’ assets and liabilities, which prevented 
them from honoring the implicit insurance commitments they had made to their clients. 
High leverage and liquidity on demand, which limited the size of the buffers available 
against shocks, made these wedges lethal.  
 
While the proximate triggers of these crises are fairly clear, the most interesting 
question is why financial intermediaries continue to contract such huge implicit insurance 
commitments while failing recurrently at honoring them, in the U.S. or elsewhere. Going 
back to the fundamentals of financial decision making, three possible explanations spring 
to mind: (i) managers of financial institutions understood the risks they were taking but 
made the bet because they thought they could capture the upside windfalls and leave the 
downside risks to others (the agency paradigm); (ii) managers understood the risks they 
were taking, yet went ahead because they did not internalize the social risks and costs of 
their actions (the externalities paradigm); and (iii) managers did not fully understand the 
risks they were running into; instead, they reacted emotionally to a constantly evolving, 
uncertain world of rapid financial innovation, with an excess of optimism on the way up 
and, once unexpected icebergs were spotted on the path, a gripping fear of the unknown on 
the way down (the mood swings paradigm).  
 
These three paradigms reflect human condition in a nutshell. In the agency 
paradigm, the better informed are constantly tempted to take advantage of the less 
informed and, ultimately, the state. By contrast, in the externalities paradigm, financial 
intermediaries are free agents whose decisions do not necessarily coincide with the public 
good, or in the case of group coordination failures, with their own good. In the mood 
swings paradigm, like all market participants, managers of financial institutions have 
bounded capacity to deal with the genuine uncertainty lying ahead, which is naturally 
associated with bouts of risk euphoria (“this time around, things are really under 
control…”) followed by episodes of sudden alarm and deep risk retrenchment. 
 
The next question that naturally comes to mind is why such similarly triggered 
crises have continued to recur notwithstanding the development over the last eighty years 
                                                 
1 Throughout this paper we use the term “Subprime crisis” to denote the current, broader crisis of structured 
securitization and its propagation across financial markets and borders. 
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or so of a formidable set of prudential regulations precisely designed to prevent systemic 
failures. Not only has regulation failed abysmally but attempts to seek a safer regulatory 
path ahead seem in some cases to have made matters subsequently worse. For example, a 
key piece of regulatory legislation coming out of the Great Depression was the Glass-
Steagall Act that sought to shield commercial banks from stock market price fluctuations 
by barring them from investment banking. In turn, the S&L crisis launched the regulatory 
push towards securitization as a way to pass on to markets much of the risk associated with 
housing and other longer term finance. Yet, investment banks and securitization are 
precisely two ingredients at the epicenter of the Subprime crisis.  
 
This paper argues that the failure of regulation largely resulted from a piecemeal 
approach to reform that looked at one paradigm at a time. In trying to address the central 
problem under one paradigm, they made the problems under the others worse. Thus, the 
creation of the Federal Reserve System in 1914 and introduction of deposit insurance after 
the Great Depression, which set the stage for the public lender-of-last-resort function and 
were meant to alleviate the instability resulting from recurring runs on the banking system 
(a problem of externalities), exacerbated the agency-moral hazard problem. In turn, the 
strengthening of prudential norms after the S&L crisis, meant to address the acute moral 
hazard manifestations observed during that crisis, indirectly exacerbated the externalities 
problem—it drove much of the intermediation outside the prudentially more tightly 
regulated sphere of commercial banking; once there, participants had less incentives 
(regulatory-induced or otherwise) to internalize the externality and hold systemic buffers 
(liquidity or capital). This last problem of course came back to haunt us in the Subprime 
crisis. 
 
Moreover, while following this game of tag and run between moral hazard and 
externalities, regulation missed all along another central suspect: asset bubbles growing 
and bursting under the impact of rapidly shifting animal spirits. In the Great Depression, 
the bubble and crash were driven by stock prices; in the Subprime crisis, they were driven 
by housing prices and the weaknesses of subprime mortgage lending suddenly emerging 
from the fog. To reconcile theory and facts, the third, missing (or much less developed) 
paradigm—which puts Knightian uncertainty and the associated mood swings (more than 
incentive misalignments) at center stage—needs to be recognized and dealt with. 
 
Looking ahead, regulatory reform is largely complicated by the fact that the 
internal logic of each of the three paradigms leads to different and often inconsistent 
regulatory implications. In the pure agency paradigm, the only task of the regulator is to 
mitigate principal-agent problems by fostering market discipline—mainly through the 
disclosure of ample, reliable information and by ensuring that financial intermediaries’ 
“skin in the game” is sufficient to maintain their incentives aligned in the right direction. A 
properly set regulatory framework should thus eliminate the risk of systemic crises.  
 
By contrast, in the pure externalities paradigm, as markets of their own cannot 
close the wedge between private and social costs and benefits, the relevant regulation 
cannot be “market friendly” and the supervisor’s role becomes more central. Moreover, 
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because of the high cost associated with crisis-proofing, the system’s exposure to some tail 
risk (akin to “one hundred year floods”) is likely to remain. The ex-ante crowd 
coordination and control role of the supervisor needs therefore to double up, if a crisis 
materializes, with an ex-post fireman role.  
 
Finally, in the pure mood swings paradigm there are no incentive distortions but 
market participants do not fully (and spontaneously) visualize the dynamic and systemic 
risk implications of market completion and innovation. Hence, markets on their own are 
unlikely to provide efficient pricing signals.
2 Unless effective safeguards can be put into 
place, this severely undermines the Basel II-type, risk-based regulatory architecture where 
every risk can presumably be assessed and translated into an efficient prudential norm. By 
the same token, the mood swings paradigm boosts the role (and responsibility) of the 
supervisor, who has to become a scout and a moderator, constantly looking for possible 
systemic trouble ahead and slowing down the system when uncertainty becomes too large.  
 
To be successful, any reform of prudential regulation will need to integrate the key 
insights and sidestep the main pitfalls of all three paradigms in a way that limits 
inconsistencies and maintains a proper balance between financial stability and financial 
development. Overcoming these tensions will require a dialogue between researchers and 
policy makers whose perception of the world may be colored by different paradigms. One 
of the aims of this paper is to contribute to this dialogue.  
 
The paper also proposes a set of basic objectives that any regulatory reform should 
seek to fulfill in a multi-paradigm world. Reflecting the main current pitfall of un-
internalized externalities, the reform will need to improve the alignment of incentives by 
internalizing (at least partially) systemic liquidity risk, thereby lessening the likelihood of 
crises. However, it should do so in a way that ensures regulatory neutrality and leaves 
room for prudentially unregulated intermediaries to enter and innovation to thrive. At the 
same time, reflecting the pitfalls of uncertainty and mood swings, the reform will also need 
to pay more attention to the risks of financial innovation and rebalance the monitoring 
roles of markets and supervisors, with the latter acquiring more responsibilities but also 
more powers. Since in a world of externalities and uncertainty-driven mood swings even 
the best regulation and supervision are unlikely to fully eliminate the risk of systemic 
crises, improving the systemic features of the safety net will continue to be an essential 
objective. 
 
Consistent with these objectives, we propose: (i) making prudential norms also a 
function of the maturity structure of the intermediary’s liabilities; (ii) giving prudentially 
                                                 
2 Throughout the paper, we refer to market discipline as “spontaneous market discipline”, i.e., as the 
monitoring that markets have a natural incentive to carry out provided that information is sufficient and there 
is a proper control infrastructure, including reliable contract enforcement and effective governance. However, 
market discipline can also be “induced” by government regulatory requirements—for example, compulsory 
private insurance—that reward market participants for their monitoring services. Whether there is scope for 
expanding induced market discipline in a multi-paradigm world is at this stage an open question to which the 
paper will allude only briefly in the concluding section. 
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unregulated intermediaries the choice between becoming regulated (with the same capital 
adequacy requirements as commercial banks) or remaining unregulated subject to the 
condition of not funding themselves in the capital markets (in other words, prudentially 
unregulated intermediaries could only borrow from regulated intermediaries);
3 (iii) giving 
the regulator more powers to authorize innovations and norm instruments; (iv) enabling the 
supervisor (through appropriate statutory powers, accountability, and tools) to play a more 
“holistic” role by focusing more on the system (its risks, evolution, links, etc.), and to set 
and calibrate (within bounds) countercyclical prudential requirements depending on 
changing circumstances, much as the interest rate is calibrated by monetary authorities; 
and (v) revisiting the deposit insurance to incorporate systemic risk, rethinking the LOLR 
as a risk absorber of last resort, and examining the feasibility of pairing them with a 
systemic insurance subscribed by all financial intermediaries.
4  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 goes back to the 
foundations and pitfalls of intermediary-based finance and briefly retraces the steps and 
objectives of modern regulation. Sections 3 to 5 present alternative interpretations of the 
Subprime crisis from the perspective of each of the three paradigms. Section 6 sums up the 
main failures of regulation and emphasizes the deep contrasts that exist between the three 
paradigms when one tries to address these failures. Section 7 concludes by laying down a 
minimum set of basic objectives that would need to be met in order to ensure a more 
harmonious integration of the three paradigms.         
 
2.  The Foundations of the Current Prudential Framework 
 
Finance seeks to bridge three basic gaps (Chart 1). First, there is an information 
and control gap (a principal-agent problem) that reflects fund suppliers’ exposure to the 
idiosyncratic risks and costs involved in properly screening and monitoring fund users, and 
enforcing contracts with them. Second, there is a price volatility-uncertainty gap that 
reflects fund suppliers’ aversion to becoming exposed to aggregate risks (market-specific 
or systemic) over which they have no control. Third, there is a liquidity-maturity gap that 
reflects fund suppliers’ “opportunistic” desire to maintain access to their funds and a quick 
exit option at all times. This third motive responds both to idiosyncratic risks (a quick exit 
disciplines fund users and mitigates agency problems) and aggregate risks (liquid 
portfolios and flights to cash mitigate exposure to uncertainty and mood shifts). Each of 
the gaps is naturally associated with a paradigm: the information and control gap with the 
agency paradigm, the liquidity and maturity gap with the externalities paradigm, and the 
volatility and uncertainty gap with the mood swings paradigm.   
 
The financial system helps investors bridge these gaps in different ways and 
through various channels, the choice of which depends in part on transaction costs and 
                                                 
3 The obvious complement to this approach would be to ensure that all the direct and indirect credit risk 
exposures (on- and off-balance sheet) of the regulated intermediaries are backed by capital (“skin-in-the-
game”), at a level which ensures regulatory neutrality. 
4 Needless to say, to avoid exacerbating cross-border arbitrage, any such reform would require broad 
international agreement on the essence of the reforms and their modalities of implementation across borders. 
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borrower size (Table 1). At the one extreme, markets bridge the principal-agent gap 
through hard public information (arms-length lending), the liquidity gap through the ability 
to trade financial contracts easily in deep markets, and the volatility gap through derivative 
contracts. Asset managers (mutual funds, pension funds, brokers, etc.) cover the middle 
ground. They help fund suppliers fill the agency gap through expert screening and 
continuous monitoring (including through direct board room participation), the liquidity 
gap through pooling, and the volatility gap through diversification. At the other extreme 
are financial intermediaries that engage in leverage. Commercial banks—the prototypical 
financial intermediaries—bridge the agency gap through soft private information 
(relationship lending), debt contracts (a disciplining device), and capital (skin-in-the-
game). They help investors deal with the volatility and liquidity gaps by offering them 
deposits (debt contracts) redeemable at par and on demand, and absorb the ensuing risks 
through capital and liquidity buffers.
5 Remarkably, debt and capital (hence leverage) play a 
key role in intermediaries’ ability to deal with each of the three gaps. 
 
By interposing their balance sheet between borrowers (through assets whose 
underlying value fluctuates with economic conditions) and investors (through liabilities 
whose value is fixed by contract), financial intermediaries become exposed to systemic 
risk. They may fail to address this risk in a socially optimal way, reflecting market failures 
that also map all three gaps and paradigms portrayed in this paper. While we will describe 
these failures more fully in each of the three subsequent sections, a brief preview here will 
help establish the historic setting and rationale for the current regulatory framework.  
 
Principal-agent problems give rise to a variety of malfeasance manifestations, most 
importantly moral hazard.
6 Should all depositors be well informed, banks could eliminate 
moral hazard to the satisfaction of depositors by holding capital.
7 But the mix of small 
uninformed depositors and larger, better informed investors can lead to inefficient 
equilibria in which banks and wholesale investors benefit at the expense of the retail 
depositors (or their deposit insurance).
8 Governance issues compound the problem by 
                                                 
5 In addition, intermediaries, unlike markets, can offer “incomplete” contracts that provide more ex-post 
flexibility in adjusting to unforeseen circumstances that can lead to failures in honoring the contracts. See 
Boot et al. (1993) and Rajan (1998). 
6 The list of malfeasance manifestations with which bankers and other financial intermediaries have been 
associated over the ages also includes adverse selection, predatory lending, outright fraud and pyramid 
schemes (Ponzi finance). In this paper, we will broadly lump together all forms of malfeasance within the 
agency paradigm but focus primarily on moral hazard because it is the only one that raises “prudential” 
issues, i.e., issues of risk management.  
7 Moral hazard is a reflection of limited liability (limited capital). There is an important literature that 
questions the need for (and optimality of) capital requirements imposed from the outside. See in particular 
Kim and Santomero (1988), Berger, Herring, and Szego (1995), Diamond and Rajan (2000), and Allen and 
Gale (2005). 
8 The literature has mostly stressed the “bright side” of wholesale finance, where small depositors free ride 
on the monitoring and disciplining services of larger investors (see for example Calomiris and Khan, 1991). 
However, Huang and Ratnovski (2008) recently showed that there is also a “dark side” to wholesale finance. 
In the presence of a noisy public signal on the state of the bank, wholesale investors may relax their 
monitoring and rely instead on an early exit as soon as there is any adverse change in the public signal, 
whether warranted or not. The fact that the smaller investors will stay put (which in their model reflects the 
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superposing additional layers of moral hazard. In particular, bank managers may take 
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Table 1.  Filling the finance gaps  
Gap  Channel of 
finance  Information/Control Liquidity/Maturity Volatility/Uncertainty
Markets 
Hard information and 
governance standards 
Deep, liquid secondary 
markets  Derivative markets 
Asset Managers 
Expert screening, direct 
board participation and 
monitoring the monitors 
Pooling Diversification 
Intermediaries 
Relationship lending, debt 
and capital (skin in game) 
Pooling, demandable 
debt and capital/liquidity 
(buffers) 
Diversification, debt and 
capital (buffer)  
 
     
                                                                                                                                                    
presence of deposit insurance) facilitates the exit of the large investors. In this context, it is indeed surprising 
that the inherent tension within the deposit insurance as currently conceived—meant to cover only small 
depositors in non systemic events but de facto exposed to systemic losses resulting from early runs by the 
large depositors—has not received more attention.   
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The opportunistic behavior of fund suppliers or intermediaries faces an externalities 
problem. Financial intermediaries are exposed to runs by their depositors or lenders, 
triggered by self-fulfilling panics or suspicions of intermediary insolvency. Even if they 
could limit this risk by holding sufficient capital and liquidity, their incentive to do so is 
limited by the fact that they do not internalize the social costs of a run, i.e., by the existence 
of externalities.
9   
 
The attitude of financial intermediaries (as well as that of other agents) towards 
price volatility also gives rise to a market failure in that their decisions in the face of 
uncertainty are influenced by mood swings. They incur bouts of excessive optimism 
(exuberance) during the upwards phase of financial expansions and excessive pessimism 
(extreme uncertainty aversion) during contractions. In either case, this compounds price 
volatility and can lead to sharp deviations from underlying fundamentals (bubbles).   
 
Regulation has been designed to help intermediaries overcome the two first pitfalls, 
albeit not the third. The current regime rests on three key pillars: (i) prudential norms that 
seek to align incentives ex-ante; (ii) an ex-post safety net (deposit insurance and lender-of-
last-resort) aimed at enticing small depositors to join the banking system and forestalling 
contagious runs on otherwise solvent institutions; and (iii) a “line-in-the-sand” separating 
the world of the prudentially regulated (mainly commercial banking) from that of the 
unregulated.  
 
In turn, the line-in-the-sand rests on at least three key arguments. First, regulation is 
costly and can produce unintended distortions. It can limit innovation and competition, and 
it needs to be accompanied by good, hence inherently costly, supervision. Second, 
extending bad oversight (oversight on the cheap) beyond commercial banking can 
exacerbate moral hazard—it can give poorly regulated intermediaries an undeserved 
“quality” label (hence an edge in the market place) and an easy scapegoat (blame the 
regulator if there is a problem). Third, investors outside the realm of the small depositor 
are well informed and fully responsible for their investments. As a result, they should 
monitor adequately the unregulated financial intermediaries, making sure their capital is 
sufficient to eliminate moral hazard.  
 
Consistent with this line-in-the-sand rationale, only deposit-taking intermediaries 
are prudentially fully regulated and supervised under the current regulatory architecture. In 
exchange, and reflecting their systemic importance, they benefit from a safety net. Other 
financial intermediaries (and all other capital markets players) neither enjoy the safety net 
nor are burdened by full-blown prudential norms. Instead, they are mostly (if not only) 
subject to market discipline, enhanced by well known securities markets regulations 
focused on transparency, governance, investor protection, market integrity, etc.  
                                                 
9 There is a vast and rapidly expanding literature on the underpinnings of the demand for liquidity and the 
drivers of liquidity crises. In all cases there is a basic externality at the core of the respective models: 
liquidity has public good features which liquidity providers cannot fully appropriate. See: Diamond and 
Dybvig (1983), Holmstrom and Tirole (1998), Diamond and Rajan (2000), and Kahn and Santos (2008). 
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Interestingly, the early history of regulatory intervention, which was marked by the 
introduction of the safety net, was more closely linked to externalities than to agency 
problems. However, subsequent regulatory developments came to be dominated by 
concerns about principal-agent frictions, particularly moral hazard, which the safety net 
itself exacerbated. But at this point the logic of the line-in the-sand completely missed the 
obvious facts that, even if free markets take care of principal-agent problems, they will 
(nearly by definition) neither internalize externalities spontaneously, nor temper mood 
swings and price risk appropriately where genuine uncertainty exists. Thus, the regulatory 
architecture that is in place today became seriously unbalanced.
10  
 
In fact, the line-in-the-sand became porous and was widely breached during the 
build-up to the Subprime crisis, as highly-leveraged intermediation developed outside the 
confines of traditional banking—in what has now become known as the world of “shadow-
banking”—and the safety net had to be eventually sharply expanded, from the regulated to 
the unregulated.
11 The explosive growth of “shadow banking”—driven by the originate-to-
distribute model, which relied on the securitization of credit risk, off-balance sheet 
transactions and vehicles, and fast expansion highly-leveraged intermediation by 
investment banks, insurance companies, and hedge funds—has been so well documented 
elsewhere that it is not necessary to reiterate the details here.
12 It is only worth stressing 
that, by radically expanding the interface between markets and intermediaries, the process 
brought a variety of new problems and issues. However, the same underlying pitfalls of 
agency problems, liquidity runs, and mood-driven cycles reappeared with a vengeance.  
 
In what follows, we interpret the story behind this shift to “shadow banking”—its 
roots, dynamics, and implications—from the vantage point of each of the three paradigms. 
As many of the observed features of the Subprime crisis can be consistent with more than 
one of the three paradigms, attribution is inherently problematic and conclusive proofs are 
virtually impossible. Hence, the strategy is to work out the internal logic of each paradigm 
taken by itself, so as to illustrate its potential explanatory power as well as highlight its 
internal limitations. We will also refer to structural factors such as financial innovation, 
competition, and regulatory arbitrage when useful to illustrate the inner workings of a 
particular paradigm, albeit such factors affect all paradigms. On the other hand, although 
we certainly recognize the importance of macroeconomic impulses such as the savings glut 
(and related macroeconomic imbalances) and the “Greenspan factor” (the long period of 
                                                 
10 In modern terms, the prudential framework can be seen as a “line of defense” or “buffer” that partially 
shields public funds from bank losses by reinforcing market discipline and putting a positive price on the 
safety net. While focusing on capital, the existing prudential framework clearly goes beyond capital—it 
includes liquidity requirements, loan-loss provisioning, fit and proper rules, loan concentration limits, prompt 
corrective actions, bank failure resolution procedures, etc.  
11 Key players in the Subprime meltdown included commercial banks (the prototypical financial 
intermediaries) and other intermediaries that blossomed outside the banking system and became hyper-
leveraged (mainly investment banks but also insurance companies, hedge funds, as well as commercial banks 
themselves trespassing into securities markets through off-balance sheet special investment vehicles—SIVs). 
12 See for example Adrian and Shin (2008), Brunnermeier (2008), Gorton (2008), and Greenlaw et al. (2008). 
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low interest rates), we restrict our attention to prudential failures because they are the ones 
that matter for regulatory reform.    
 
3.  The Agency Paradigm 
 
The moral hazard-agency story of the Subprime crisis is arguably the most 
popular.
13 It posits that incentive distortions arising from unchecked principal-agent 
problems (the heads-I-win-tails-you-lose syndrome) are the source of trouble, inducing 
market participants to either pass on risks deceptively to the less informed or take on too 
much risk themselves with the expectation of capturing the upside or exiting on time and 
leaving the downside with someone else. The perversion of incentives can happen at one or 
several points of the credit chain between the borrower and ultimate investor, passing 
through the various intermediate links.
  
 
However, for moral hazard to start driving the show, it must be the case that the 
expected upside benefits come to dominate the expected downside costs (i.e., losing one’s 
capital or reputation). This can occur under two plausible scenarios: (i) an innovation 
(perhaps facilitated by deregulation) opens a world of new opportunities (the upside 
widens), or (ii) a macro systemic shock suddenly wipes out a large part of the 
intermediaries’ capital (the downside shrinks).
14 Indeed, one can argue that in the case of 
the Subprime crisis it was the discovery of new instruments and intermediation schemes 
(securitization and shadow-banking) which set the process in motion.
15 The expansion of 
upside opportunities led to a moral hazard-induced under-pricing of risk, encouraging 
participants to make the bet and take the plunge.
16 This process, which Basel I regulation 
encouraged, can be explained in part by regulatory arbitrage.
17 However, poor regulation 
(that did not sufficiently align the incentives of principals and agents, whether the risk was 
acquired off or on balance sheet) can no doubt also be blamed. 
 
                                                 
13 See for example Caprio et al. (2008) and Calomiris (2008). 
14 The sudden opening of profitable new business opportunities that set the cycle’s upswing into motion is 
what Fisher (1933) called a “displacement”. 
15 By contrast, the S&L crisis can be viewed as driven by deregulation and the rise in interest rates that 
effectively de-capitalized the system (a reduction of downside risks), unleashing the subsequent rounds of 
“betting for survival”. The process was exacerbated by the lack of fair value accounting (which aggravated 
information asymmetry problems while allowing insolvent institutions to continue operating normally) and 
generous regulatory forbearance.  
16 There is a body of literature emphasizing moral hazard-caused deviations of asset prices from their 
fundamental values. See for example Allen and Gale (1998). While these deviations may be interpreted as 
“bubbles”, the underlying models are typically static. 
17 Basel I prudential standards encouraged securitization through differential risk weights (a mortgage held 
on a bank’s balance sheet is charged with a 50 percent risk weight, against only 20 percent if securitized). At 
the same time, although Basel I did incorporate some off-balance sheet commitments, conversion factors 
limited their impact on capital. Banks could also circumvent regulation through innovations such as tranching 
and indirect credit enhancements, the use of the trading book rather than the banking book, and other balance 
sheet adjustments. See Tarullo (2008). 
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Indeed, the build-up phase of the crisis provided plenty of opportunities for 
principal-agent problems to expand and deepen. The multiplication of actors (borrowers, 
loan originators, servicers, securitization arrangers, rating agencies, asset managers, final 
investors) involved in the originate-to-distribute model not only reflected the increased 
sophistication and complexity of intermediation but also boosted the scope for 
accompanying agency frictions, not just moral hazard but also predatory lending, mortgage 
fraud, and adverse selection.
18 The widespread preference of unregulated intermediaries to 
lever up on the basis of mainly short-term funds can also be interpreted as driven by moral 
hazard. Managers (particularly, but not only, asset managers) also seemed to have danced 
eagerly to the moral hazard tune. While enjoying the high returns of the good times, they 
let their shareholders and investors deal with the losses in the bad times under the 
convenient excuse that everybody shared the same miseries.
19 
 
A good case can also be made that the state promoted moral hazard on the way up. 
Some argue, for example, that the widespread subsidies and guarantees provided to the 
housing financing sector in an effort to boost access (exacerbated by Fannie Mae’s and 
Freddie Mac’s “quasi-mandated” foray into the sub-prime sector) can be blamed for 
launching the ball and boosting its moral hazard momentum once in play.
20 The failure to 
control the build-up phase can then be attributed to the regulator’s inability to win the cat-
and-mouse game of regulatory arbitrage. Banks managed to stay on top by swiftly moving 
to the shadow-banking world, with regulators hardly able to keep up.
21 The extreme 
fragmentation and overlapping mandates of agencies that comprise the U.S. supervisory 
system was of course the final blow. Had the regulators been aware and statutorily able to 
do something, the necessary coordination was just too much to handle.  
 
The agency paradigm is self-contained in that it carries the seeds of its own demise. 
Once participants have taken the plunge, they have little or nothing more to lose by taking 
on additional risk. A dynamic could be thus unleashed that pushed bets higher and higher 
as less risky investment opportunities became gradually exhausted. Indeed, there is good 
evidence that risk taking by mortgage originators mushroomed over the cycle as less and 
                                                 
18 Ashcraft and Schuerman (2008) analyze the “seven deadly frictions of asymmetric information” that 
unfolded with a vengeance in the originate-to-distribute world. 
19 The managers masquerading their excessive tail-risk taking as clever investment moves are dubbed by 
Rajan (2008a) as “fake-alphas”. The perfect excuse for the bad times is defined by Calomiris (2008) as 
“plausible deniability”. Reflecting their greater concern for the short-term bottom line than for the potential 
longer term risks (perhaps reflecting mostly backward looking compensation schemes), operational managers 
seem to have paid insufficient attention to the concerns of risk managers. On issues of managerial 
compensation and the scope for managerial “abuse”, see also Dewatripont and Tirole (1994), Brunnermeier 
(2008), and Gorton and Winston (2008). 
20 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—the giant mortgage government-sponsored enterprises—could meet their 
mandated social housing goals by buying eligible subprime mortgages. For a summary of public policy 
actions to promote housing finance see Calomiris (2008). 
21 For good narratives along these lines, see Caprio et al. (2008), and Calomiris (2008). 
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less creditworthy borrowers were gradually let in.
22 Such dynamics should be naturally 
unstable and eventually collapse on their own weight.
23   
 
Once the crisis hit, the liberal unfolding of the safety net under the gun of systemic 
contagion (lender-of-last-resort by the Fed and bail outs by the Treasury) clearly validated 
any moral hazard incentives that might have led to the crisis. In particular, it facilitated the 
early exit of at least some of the well-informed large investors, rewarding those who had 
lent imprudently (and allegedly knowingly). Another moral hazard booster in the ex-post 
unfolding of the safety net was that, for the most part, large institutions were not closed 
and, perhaps more importantly, managers were allowed to stay in charge.
24  
 
In sum, the moral hazard tune does ring true in many respects. However, important 
questions remain. First, for shadow banking to be explainable by moral hazard, it must 
have allowed commercial banks to pile on more risk. However, whether, on balance, 
commercial banks ended up shedding or piling risk through securitization is not entirely 
clear, albeit some evidence seems to militate in favor of the latter.
25 As intended by the 
early promoters of securitization, the sale of mortgage-backed securities to investment 
banks should in and of itself, have reduced (not increased) commercial banks’ riskiness. In 
reality, however, much of the risk was not divested away. Instead, commercial banks 
repurchased good chunks of the instruments they sold, for reputational as well as business 
continuity reasons, and remained committed to support investment banks through their 
back-stop liquidity facilities (they were lenders of first resort to capital markets players). 
Moreover, they generally retained the more risky assets (or the more risky tranches) while 
shedding away the less risky ones.
26 At the same time, they moved down the credit market 
to take on new and arguably higher risks associated with consumer, mortgage, and SME 
lending. They also accumulated more risk by engaging in widespread rating arbitrage 
(shopping for the most favorable ratings).
27 
 
Moreover, even if one believes that banks did accumulate more risk, it does not 
necessarily follow that this was induced by moral hazard. Indeed, commercial banks could 
have genuinely bought the risk under the presumption that it was safe for them to store it 
(they perceived the regulations to be too tight and their capital more than enough to cover 
                                                 
22 On the propensity for increased risk taking, see Dell’ Ariccia et al. (2008), and Keys et al. (2008). Leamer 
(2008) goes further to argue that there was a gradual shift from hedge finance to speculative finance and then 
to outright Ponzi finance during the recent housing cycle. 
23 In the end, the trigger for the crisis under the pure agency paradigm should still be a stochastic event 
(moral hazard would cease to operate if there was no longer a possible upside, as unlikely as it might be). 
That event, however, can be so small that it ceases to be relevant. 
24 Curiously, while deposit insurance fully protected the small depositor, much less was done to protect the 
small borrower (that has been an important asymmetry as regards consumer protection). 
25 Rajan (2005) presents evidence that suggests some increase in overall banking risk, as indicators of banks’ 
distance to default have not risen in many developed countries and bank earnings variability has not fallen in 
the United States. Instead, the risk premium implicit in bank stocks appears to have risen.    
26 See for example Ambrose et al. (2005).  
27 See Brunnermeier (2008). 
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the associated risks). Under this interpretation, to which we will come back under the 
externalities paradigm, commercial banks ventured into new markets and new instruments 
simply because they had a comparative advantage in doing so.  
 
Perhaps more importantly, the main piece of the puzzle that does not quite fit this 
paradigm is the blatant asymmetry between the smart ones who are alleged to have 
consciously caused havoc and all the rest of the financial market participants who were not 
paying attention. In particular, why did the markets (informed investors and shareholders) 
fail to discipline financial intermediaries? In the end, many investors surely got it wrong 
and lost tons of money; a multitude of bank shareholders got wiped out; and many 
managers likely have had second thoughts about having played so eagerly the alpha card. 
In this context, supervisors must surely also be thinking that it is unfair to treat them as if 
they were the only ones asleep at the wheel.  
 
The moral hazard story inherently requires a strong agency problem, caused either 
by high enforcement costs or deep crevices of information asymmetry. Arguably, 
principals (shareholders and large investors) lacked the incentives or regulatory tools that 
might have helped them, collectively, to align the actions of their agents (managers). 
However, it is difficult to believe that principals would not have taken early disciplinary 
action on their own, if only by voting with their feet, had they really understood the risks 
agents were taking. Thus, setting aside the problem faced by the regulators as regards the 
growth of the unregulated sector, enforcement costs are not really consistent with the 
lengthy gestation of the build-up to the crisis nor with the short-term nature of the 
financing that supported that build-up. A better case can perhaps be made for the 
intensification of information asymmetry resulting from the opacity, complexity, and 
interconnectedness of the new age housing finance market.
28 Arguably, this could have 
provided a cover under which the ones at the top of the pack could have hidden their 
operations. Yet, it still remains hard to fathom that this “scam” would take place for such a 
long period, during which the asymmetry between those who were “in” and those who 
were “out” would linger unabated, and that this would happen in a market place where tips, 
news, and information are produced by the ton every minute. 
 
4.  The Externalities Paradigm 
 
Externalities, the mirror image of individual opportunism, clearly play a major role 
in the collapsing phase of any crisis. Seeking to save oneself by running for the exits puts 
the others at increased risk of a major meltdown with extreme social costs, thereby 
exacerbating the violence of the downturn. But externalities also play a key role during the 
build up stage, making the system inherently more fragile. The failure to internalize the 
costs of a systemic crisis is at the core of the insufficient demand for prudential buffers, 
including in particular liquidity, which has features of a public good. Externalities can also 
induce bubble-type deviations of asset prices from their fundamentals.
29 They can also 
                                                 
28 See for example Gorton (2008). 
29 Because individual agents do not internalize the general equilibrium impact on asset prices of fire sales 
under financial distress, they can bid up the price of these assets in excess of their socially optimal value. 
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result in under-production of information and monitoring (free-riding) and over-extension 
of credit during upswings, over-contraction during downswings (in both cases, the 
marginal lender can “sour the market”, increasing the vulnerability of other lenders to a 
default). Last but not least, coordination failures (a form of un-internalized externalities) 
can also play an important role in lengthening and aggravating the upwards phase of the 
cycle. Market participants may know it is in their best interest to prevent an asset bubble 
yet fail to do so because doing the right thing would only be optimal if everybody else in 
the group did it too. Supervisors, both across agencies and across countries, are similarly 
vulnerable to such coordination failures. For example, tightening regulation in isolation has 
a high cost, as business will quickly flow to the less regulated sectors or countries.   
 
The lack of sufficient buffers was indeed at the core of the severity of the collapse. 
As in the case of traditional banking, shadow banking was financed mostly through short-
term obligations (and largely perceived to be redeemable at par), much of it through 
overnight repos. The potential for a bank-type run was therefore there from the outset. But 
two additional factors made for a much more explosive situation. First, the financing came 
mainly from ready-to-run wholesale investors, thereby introducing a new, more unstable 
layer to the intermediation process. Second, the capital and liquidity buffers held by most 
shadow-banking intermediaries to protect their short-term liabilities from price fluctuations 
in the final asset (housing) were much smaller than in traditional commercial banking. This 
reflected the high leverage of self-standing investment banks and (to a less extent) hedge 
funds, as well as the lack of capital put in by the final borrowers who benefited from high 
loan-to-value ratios and second mortgages. Thus, as documented elsewhere in detail, once 
a tail-risk event materialized and pressures to sell started to build up, the devastating 
downward spiral quickly dried up liquidity and brought markets to a standstill.
30  
 
In the shadow banking world, the externality pitfall of traditional banking operated 
with a vengeance, as everyone counted on everyone else’s for support but no one 
adequately internalized the systemic risks of such cross-support. Investment banks counted 
on commercial banks (both for liquidity and for asset repurchases);
31 commercial banks 
counted on market liquidity (why hold liquid backing against assets which you can sell at 
any time in the market place?); and leveraged intermediaries counted on credit default 
swaps and other forms of insurance issued by other leveraged institutions.  In the process, a 
great fallacy of composition developed—leading market players (and supervisors) wrongly 
to believe that risk protections at the individual level would add up to systemic risk 
                                                                                                                                                    
Lorenzoni (2007) develops a model along these lines and shows that competitive financial contracts can 
result in excessive borrowing ex-ante and excessive volatility ex-post. As in Holmstrom and Tirole (1998), 
agents cannot insure themselves against aggregate liquidity shocks due to a limited ability to commit to 
future repayments (this in turn reflects agency frictions). Korinek (2008) develops a paper along the same 
lines but applied to capital flows rather than domestic intermediation (in his model, agents borrow too much 
because they do not internalize the potential impact of an exchange rate move on a systemically-induced 
need for sudden repayment). 
30 See Greenlaw et al. (2008), Adrian and Shin (2007 and 2008), and Brunnermeier (2008).  
31 Yet, there were no capital charges for such “reputational” credit lines (see Brunnermeier, 2008). 
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protection. Yet, markets for individual risk protection instruments could only continue 
functioning if some intermediary was willing to continue “making the market”.
32  
 
The extreme systemic fragility of such interconnectedness has by now become 
obvious.
33 By unloading (selling) risk—for example through credit default swaps—to other 
financial institutions such as insurance companies, intermediaries further intensified the 
negative systemic externalities.
34 Such transactions might have reduced the exposure of 
institutions individually but increased the exposure of the system as a whole. Yet, this 
move was openly encouraged by regulators (insured assets had a low or zero risk weight), 
who viewed it as a way to reinforce market discipline (again, an example where moral 
hazard and externality containment directly collided). The possible systemic costs of 
trading credit derivatives over the counter (without a central clearing counterparty or 
protocols for multilateral netting), rather than on an exchange, were not internalized either.   
 
While the fragility brought about by externalities has received much attention in the 
crisis literature, an equally important consequence of un-internalized externalities that has 
received much less attention is their implication for regulatory arbitrage. As in the case of 
moral hazard, the growth of shadow banking can also be explained as externality-induced 
incentives to circumvent regulation. The key difference is one of intent. From an 
externality viewpoint, intermediaries were “doing nothing wrong” by finding new ways to 
take on more risk. Instead of seeking to take one-sided bets with someone else’s money, as 
in the agency paradigm, the intermediaries engaged in regulatory arbitrage under the 
externalities parading were just searching for ways to match more closely their risk taking 
with their risk appetite, and they were doing so in a way which, from their own (limited) 
perspective, was sufficiently safe. From their individual viewpoint, regulations were 
“unnecessarily binding”. 
 
In this sense, the intent of the Glass-Steagall Act—to shift risk away from regulated 
intermediaries to capital markets and unregulated intermediaries—was fundamentally 
misguided. While it could have solved the agency problem (by shifting risks to the land of 
the well informed) if it had been done cleanly enough (i.e., without dragging the banking 
system into the mud and the safety net over the line-in-the-sand), it exacerbated the 
externalities problem. Well-informed investors can monitor the intermediaries to make 
sure they do not “cheat them” (play the moral hazard card). However, they have no 
incentives to “internalize” the liquidity and other externalities.
35 Instead, their incentive is 
to play it safe by investing very short and running at the first signal of trouble and to 
increase leverage by as much as is privately (not socially) optimal.  
                                                 
32 The linkages between securities market liquidity and funding liquidity, and the resulting increased scope 
for liquidity spirals are analyzed by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008). 
33 The fact that most intermediaries traveled along the same path on both the way up and the way down, 
driven by similar incentives and risk management models, further boosted the systemic impact of these 
externalities. See Brunnermeier (2008). 
34 Allen and Gale (2005) discuss the possible implications for systemic risk of such transfers.  
35 A similar point was made by Bernanke (2006).  
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To be sure, reflecting regulatory shortcomings in the internalization of systemic 
liquidity risk (see below), incentives were not much better aligned for the regulated 
intermediaries. Nonetheless, capital ratios in the regulated sector substantially exceeded 
those in the unregulated sector, reflecting systemic concerns of regulators for the 
commercial banking sector.
36 Thus, the side-by-side existence of a regulated sector—
where systemic concerns were partially factored in—and an unregulated sector—where 
externalities were not at all internalized—created a wedge in returns between the two 
worlds, giving rise to a fundamentally unstable construct. Investors left in droves the 
regulated intermediaries to join the world of the less regulated, highly leveraged and short 
funded intermediaries, rapidly raising their relative size and boosting systemic risk in the 
process. Moreover, because it involved sophisticated and unsophisticated investors, the 
exodus spread moral hazard throughout the presumably moral-hazard free unregulated (or 
less regulated) world.  
 
The resulting competitive pressures on commercial banks ultimately motivated the 
repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act.
37 However, by challenging commercial banks to compete 
head-on with the blown-up investment banks—on the latter’s turf but under much stricter 
regulations—the repeal induced commercial banks to find creative ways to shed their 
regulatory burden outside their balance sheet. Thus, oddly enough, the Glass-Steagall Act 
resulted in a one-two punch on the soundness of financial intermediaries. Its introduction 
boosted systemic risk outside commercial banking. Once this was done, its repeal boosted 
systemic risk within it. 
 
As in the agency paradigm, supervisors come out severely bruised. They did not 
realize that their own well-meaning regulation was setting into motion a deadly process of 
regulatory arbitrage that shifted intermediation to a field where inducements to internalize 
externalities were weaker or nonexistent, thereby contributing to asset over-pricing and 
spreading liquidity risk all over the financial system. And even when supervisors caught 
up, they were unable to do much because in the cat-and-mouse game of regulatory 
arbitrage the mouse had trespassed over the line-in-the-sand to a territory where prudential 
regulation was not unreasonably reluctant to enter. Investment banks, hedge funds, and the 
                                                 
36 For example, investment banks’ leverage of around 25—compared to commercial banks’ leverage of only 
about 10—gave the former an obvious advantage. Although the SEC, as lead regulator, applied to investment 
banks the same Basel capital rules as for commercial banks, the differences in leverages resulted from the 
much lower capital requirements on “trading books” than on “banking books” and the fact that limits on 
gross leverage ratios only applied to commercial banks.  
37 Pushed by the forces of competition and deregulation, commercial and investment banks seemed to have 
met somewhere in the “regulatory middle”. As the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act allowed commercial 
banks to encroach more directly on investment banks’ traditional fee-based business, the former took on 
more fees in order to offset losses in intermediation margins. Also, and partly as a result of the deregulation 
of commissions for stock trading in the 1970s (that allowed low-cost brokers to encroach on investment 
banks’ brokerage activities), self-standing investment banks gradually shed their fee-based business in favor 
of a highly-leveraged margin-based business. See Eichengreen (2008). 
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like were thus simply left out of reach.
38 Moreover, even within the regulated world, the 
Basel-inspired wave of prudential regulation focused little on liquidity. And when the 
norms addressed liquidity issues, they did so from a purely idiosyncratic perspective.
39 To 
his defense, however, the externality-conscious supervisor may argue that systemic events 
such as the Subprime crisis are akin to “one-hundred year floods”. They are too rare and 
unpredictable to be usefully internalized in prudential regulations. The social cost of doing 
so (note here the italics) would simply exceed the social benefits. Hence, a better option is 
to have a prompt correction regime and an efficient public rescue system.   
 
The missing piece in this paradigm, which is otherwise convincing enough, relates 
to its dynamics. To be sure, the lack of sufficient internalization of systemic risks can lead 
as easily as moral hazard-based incentives to a more fragile and vulnerable system. Yet, 
unlike in the agency case, the externalities paradigm in and of itself lacks inherent 
dynamics that gradually increase the precariousness of the equilibrium over time and 
eventually bring the system so close to the edge that the tiniest exogenous shock would 
throw it over.
40 In the pure externalities paradigm, intermediaries continue to “manage” 
their risk, adjusting it to what is privately optimal and then just staying there. The large 
shock that eventually sent the financial system over the edge must have therefore come out 
of “left field”—an exogenous act of god, whose probability was independent of the degree 
of vulnerability of the system. However, as far as one can see, there was no such shock in 
the case of the Subprime crisis.  
 
One could argue that, instead of an exogenous shock, the engine driving the 
financial system to its eventual collapse was a real sector-driven business cycle. However, 
prudential norms are supposedly designed to allow financial systems to navigate unscathed 
through the ups and downs of the regular business cycle. Hence, this could only be a 
satisfactory explanation if the magnitude of the downturn was unprecedented and truly 
unexpected. Again, however, this does not seem likely. The financial crisis was unleashed 
in full force much before there was a marked real sector decline, with causality going 
mostly in the opposite direction.  
 
Alternatively, one could tease out some endogenous dynamics within the 
externalities paradigm by associating the externalities driving the system to a prisoner’s 
dilemma. What market participants do individually (i.e., join the feast in the boom and the 
                                                 
38 The move towards consolidated supervision of financial conglomerates was as far as prudential regulators 
were willing to extend their reach to protect the core banking system from capital market risks. 
39 For example, liquidity norms generally advocate minimum ratio of liquid assets to liabilities to limit 
maturity mismatches. But this is simply not good enough from a systemic viewpoint where even short-
maturity assets can become illiquid. Norms have failed to focus on systemic rollover risk, which is at the core 
of intermediaries’ vulnerability to runs.  
40 Some recent analysis of the unfolding of the Subprime crisis stresses the extreme market fragility resulting 
from an unexpected market realignment in a context where all the large traders have similar underlying risk 
models and objectives (Khandani and Lo, 2008). However, it is not obvious that traders would have 
continued to operate so close to the edge if they had understood the true fragility of the environment in which 
they were operating and the huge potential costs of a meltdown.  
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stampede in the bust) is clearly harmful to themselves and the group, but each participant 
would stop only if everyone else in the group did the same. That this type of coordination 
failure can generate some cyclical fluctuation stands to reason.
41 That it can lead to a 
catastrophic and expected systemic collapse is more difficult to accept. In the absence of a 
non-externalities related factor—either moral hazard (perhaps boosted by managers’ short 
incentive horizon) or a truly unexpected unfolding of events (a much bigger or much 
sooner meltdown than anyone could reasonably have expected)—one would think that at 
some point the downside risk to each individual participant of remaining in the game 
should dominate the upside risk. At that point, self-preservation should de facto force 
coordination, keeping the group some distance away from the edge of the cliff. 
  
5.  The Mood Swings Paradigm 
 
The starting point of the mood swings paradigm is the endogeneity of financial 
innovation within a broad process of financial development. The shift from traditional 
banking to shadow banking can be interpreted as the natural evolution of a rapidly 
deepening financial system in which markets and intermediaries increasingly 
complemented each other.
42 Banks commoditized credit risk through the originate-to-
distribute model and retained some credit risk to overcome agency problems.
43 At the same 
time, they used their ability to provide first resort liquidity to help markets overcome the 
remaining liquidity gap associated with the yet nascent and still overly heterogeneous 
instruments. The pressures of competition, boosted by the steady entry and rapid growth of 
unregulated (or less regulated) brokers and intermediaries (particularly investment banks), 
were clearly at the heart of such a remarkable process of financial deepening and market 
completion. 
  
However, the creation of new instruments and forms of intermediation went faster 
than the ability of market participants and supervisors to fully comprehend their 
implications and handle the risks and uncertainty associated with such a rapidly changing 
world. The opacity, complexity, and hidden interconnectedness of the Subprime world can 
thus be seen in the mood swings paradigm as bad side effects of an innovative process, but 
side effects that were either not intended or, if intended, not necessarily maliciously 
pursued.
44 The inability to think through the potential systemic implications and fragilities 
of the new universe was the fundamental and critical failure.  
                                                 
41 For example, Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) develop a model in which asset bubbles persist despite the 
presence of rational arbitrageurs because the latter cannot temporarily coordinate their selling strategies due 
to a dispersion of opinions.  
42 Through securitization, markets benefit from the screening done by intermediaries and the latter benefit 
from the more efficient parceling and tailoring of risk carried out through the markets. See Gorton and 
Winston (2002), and Song and Thakor (2008). 
43 This was certainly not a minor achievement—it involved standardizing the credit risk screening (through 
scoring and rating), breaking it up (through stripping and tranching) and dispersing it (by selling it to a wider 
base of investors and spreading it around through a new breed of credit risk derivatives).  
44 Information got lost through the “chain of complexity” and banks became exposed in the process to heavy 
“pipeline risk”. See Brunnermeier (2008) and Gorton (2008). 
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This problem was compounded by a failure to fully comprehend the links between 
financial sector dynamics and the underlying asset price dynamics, and to adequately 
understand the feedback loop between rising asset prices and expanding credit. The 
possibility of a large and nation-wide synchronized decline in housing prices (and the 
devastating implications this would have for the risk correlation assumptions underlying 
the presumed safety of credit default protections) was unthinkable because it had never 
happened since the Great Depression.
45 Moreover, when delinquency rates on mortgages 
started to rise during the mini-recession of 2002, the losses on mortgages were minimal 
because the housing market continued to boom.
46 From this perspective, falling housing 
prices and their implications for the housing finance market appear not as “tail risk” but as 
a “black swan” event, a new reality that could not be anticipated from historical series.
47 
 
Faced with the world of the new and unknown, market participants involved in the 
Subprime process no longer had a steady frame of reference. On the way up, they found 
themselves in a truly new and wonderful territory which fueled a mood of optimism and 
exuberance. This was reinforced by the decline in observed macro-financial volatility, 
predictable pricing and deep market liquidity, which further fed risk appetites and gave rise 
to pro-cyclical leveraging.
48 The low volatility environment not only had the immediate 
mechanical effect of reducing values at risk but also, the more it persisted, the more it fed 
the feeling that “this time around, things are different and the good times are here to stay”. 
New forms of macro-financial management and oversight, including the ever more 
sophisticated risk modeling, widespread divestment of risk through risk derivatives, and 
more effective and successful monetary management, were all major contributors to this 
optimistic picture.
49 Feelings such as “everything is being taken care of”, “good men are 
now in charge”, and “systemic volatility is a memory of the past which has now been 
vanquished even by the Mexicos and Brazils of this world” became so prevalent that few 
really questioned them.  
 
On the way down, the brutal downward swing in the prevalent market mood also 
fed the collapse. A significant dissonance would be enough to initiate the mood swing. In 
the Subprime crisis, the swing was arguably triggered when the CBX credit swap index on 
sub-prime based instruments started going south, colliding with the still rosy assessments 
of the rating agencies.
50 As long as there was widespread market agreement on a price 
vector, ensuring that instruments could continue to be unloaded on short notice, markets 
                                                 
45 See Gorton (2008) and Coval, Jurek, and Stafford (2008). 
46 See Calomiris (2008). 
47 See Taleb (2007). 
48 Unlike commercial banks that targeted a constant leverage throughout the cycle, investment banks’ 
leverage was heavily pro-cyclical. See Adrian and Shin (2007 and 2008).  
49 As Greenspan (1998) famously declared, the “management of systemic risk is properly the job of central 
banks” and “banks should not be required to hold capital against the possibility of an overall financial 
breakdown”.  
50 See Gorton (2008). 
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could go on functioning unperturbed (whether prices actually matched fundamentals was 
not that important as long as they were uncontested). However, by questioning the 
uniformity of market assessments, the drop in the CBX index suddenly raised the specter 
of “hidden icebergs lying ahead”. From euphoria, the mood shifted into acute Knightian 
uncertainty, where risk aversion swelled, driven by the fear of the unknown.
51 The frenzied 
recoiling of investors was compounded by general market opacity—including the 
knowledge that intermediaries were deeply interconnected coupled with utter ignorance on 
the nature and specific details of this interconnectedness. Opacity thus intensified the 
massive sell out of securities and simultaneous flight to cash, with the resulting market 
collapse and evaporation of price signals further accentuating the downward spiral.
52    
 
In this paradigm, well-meaning public policy also played a central role, both on the 
way up and on the way down. On the way up, a key and justifiable role for policy is to 
promote market completion within an evolutionary financial development process.
53 
Indeed, the set of policies designed to promote housing finance by jump-starting the 
markets for new instruments such as securitization through guarantees and subsidies can be 
viewed as sowing the earliest seeds of the crisis. The Subprime crisis grew, in effect, in the 
“shadow” of the guaranteed world of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. While such policies 
can help overcome natural impediments to market development—particularly where 
collective action is difficult and network and scale effects are significant—they can also 
help promote the illusion that risk has been reduced to a point where it ceases to be a 
predominant concern. Public intervention also played (and continues to do so) a critical 
role on the way down. In a world of uncertainty and acute swings in risk aversion, only the 
State has the shoulders needed to function as the risk-absorber-of-last-resort during 
episodes of acute, systemic failure.
54 In this view, the ex-post unfolding of unprecedented 
Fed’s lender-of-last-resort activity and the U.S. Treasury’s bail out operations can be 
interpreted as a way to drain away from the system sufficient systemic risk so as to allow 
markets to spring back up to life and intermediaries to continue operating. 
 
All in all, the mood swings paradigm presents a more rounded overall story than 
the other two paradigms, and a story with far-reaching implications at that. Unlike the 
agency paradigm, it does not require a gigantic and unyielding asymmetry of information 
between market participants that are in-the-know and those that are out. Rather, it is a 
                                                 
51 Uncertainty aversion came on top of (and interacted with) increased volatility. See Brunnermeier (2008). 
52 Panics end when information recomposes and becomes available. Intermediary-based finance is in this 
sense much more vulnerable than market-based finance, since prices are less likely to vanish in markets that 
do not rely on market-making institutions. 
53 A theoretical justification for government intervention in a context of incomplete markets can be found in 
Geneakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986). Gale (2004) shows that in the presence of incomplete markets there 
exists an implicit pecuniary externality that generally requires the imposition of capital requirements. 
54 The seminal contribution as regards the role of the State as the residual absorber of risk is that of Arrow 
and Lind (1970). See also Caballero (2009) for a recent reinterpretation of the insurance role of the State in 
systemic crisis conditions. An intriguing argument can however also be made that instead of spreading risk 
over taxpayers (current and future), risk might be more efficiently spread over existing debt holders by using 
debt equity swaps as an alternative to unconditional bail outs (see Veronesi and Zingales, 2008).  
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democratic paradigm where everybody was fooled. And unlike the externalities paradigm, 
it does not require a vengeful god to intervene exogenously with tail-risk events to unleash 
the dynamics of a downward spiral. Instead, it has its own fully endogenous dynamics, 
with favorable returns and optimism feeding each other on the way up, adverse returns and 
pessimism on the way down. The dynamics are akin to Schumpeter’s creative destruction, 
where cycles are a natural part of the evolutionary process. However, unlike the traditional 
Schumpeterian process, where some do well while others perish at every point in the cycle, 
the dynamics in the mood swings paradigm are more like “Schumpeter on steroids”, as 
financial innovation cycles can have a devastating systemic impact because everyone 
follows the same path, up the bubble and down the abyss.   
 
The mood swings paradigm, however, is not free of puzzles and difficulties. In 
particular, uncertainty-driven mood swings are easy to invoke but harder to model.
55 To be 
sure, one would expect rationality (even if bounded) and path dependence to constrain 
feasible outcomes. However, modeling options range widely, from rationally updated 
priors in a world of imperfect information to heuristically updated beliefs stemming from 
biased perceptions (personal or group-based) of an excessively complex reality. Thus, 
unlike incentive distortions under the moral hazard and externalities paradigms, which are 
firmly grounded in traditional economic theory, modeling mood swings may require some 
departure from orthodox theory. In any event, it is also rather surprising that market 
participants were seemingly oblivious to the risks underlying the process of financial 
innovation. Did such obliviousness simply reflect a difficulty to look outside the box and 
connect the dots? Did such difficulty reflect the fact that markets do not reward systemic 
risk gazing (a theme to which we will come back in the next section)? Or was something 
more sinister at play, either moral hazard or non internalized externalities? In particular, 
absent externalities, one wonders whether uncertainty alone could pack so much punch, 
particularly on the way down.  
                                                 
55 The importance of mood swings for financial bubbles and panics has been widely recognized. It finds its 
roots in Keynes’ animal spirits and Hyman Minsky’s writings on financial crises (see Minsky, 1975).  More 
recently, it was popularized by Kindleberger (1996) and Shiller (2006). While many attempts have been 
made to model mood driven-cycles within the traditional world of rational expectations with full information 
(see the seminal contribution of Azariadis, 1981), the conditions for such rational bubbles to exist have been 
shown to be rather limited (Santos and Woodford, 1997). However, moods play a much more important role 
once one assumes problems with the information (imprecision or uncertainty) or the way one deals with it, 
which, in turn, may (or may not) require abandoning the assumption of full rationality. Epstein and Wang 
(1994), and more recently Fostel and Geneakoplos (2008), showed that multiple priors can lead to models 
where beliefs influence asset prices in a fully rational world. In addition, Geweke (2001) and Weitzman 
(2007) showed that, when there is too much uncertainty, fully rational human behavior may not conform to 
the precepts of traditional economic theory as defined by the standard expected-utility framework. 
Abandoning the assumption of full rationality opens up the scope for innate biases in the way economic 
agents process information and make decisions (see the recent surveys of behavioral finance in Barberis and 
Thaler, 2003, and Della Vigna, 2007). Attempts to explore the implications of such limitations for finance 
and credit cycles are making some headway. For example, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) showed that 
inefficient asset pricing driven by noise traders can persist despite the presence of rational arbitrageurs. Lo 
(2004) proposed an evolutionary approach to economic interactions. De Grauwe (2008) showed that it is 
possible to generate endogenous cycles when agents use simple heuristic rules to interpret the dynamics of a 
model they do not fully comprehend.  
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In sum, the overall picture one gets from systematically reviewing the three 
paradigms is that they all provide broadly plausible stories. Hence, they must all contain 
important grains of truth. Moreover, the paradigms seem to interact and feedback on each 
other in complex ways, one triggering the other or becoming more predominant at different 
stages of the cycle. Hence, a fully rounded story—one that does not leave key questions 
unanswered and fully accounts for the complexity of real life—requires combining the 
paradigms. However, multi-dimensionality makes the challenges of policy reform that 
much more difficult.  To these issues we now turn.      
 
6. Paradigms  and  Regulation 
 
In this section, we will briefly summarize what we perceive to have been the main 
failures of regulation and illustrate in broad terms how policy prescriptions to fix them will 
often not be independent of the paradigm of choice.  
 
The great failures of prudential regulation evidenced by the Subprime crisis can be 
classified into: i) failures of scope; ii) failures of focus; and iii) failures of dynamics. Take 
the failures of scope first. The “line-in-the-sand” philosophy simply did not work. The 
prevailing thinking was that opening a wide room for unregulated intermediaries to thrive 
was of little consequence to systemic stability. Knowledgeable investors would maintain 
them in line. Moreover, they were too small to be systemically important. Both 
assumptions turned out to be deadly wrong. The failure to internalize externalities in the 
unregulated world created a bias in favor of unregulated intermediaries that drew in 
unsophisticated investors in droves and made them grow explosively. In turn, this 
competitive bias induced banks to elude regulation by pushing risk outside their balance 
sheet and turn a somewhat blind eye to the risks taken by their borrowers. Thus, not only 
was risk not adequately internalized ex-ante but also the prudentially less regulated 
intermediaries quickly grew to the point where they became systemically relevant players 
and, hence, had to be admitted ex-post to the safety net, no questions asked. 
 
Consider next the failures of focus. First, the prevailing regulatory framework 
established a neatly dividing line between the ex-ante prudential norms and the ex-post 
safety net. The ex-ante regulatory framework focused on maintaining the soundness of 
assets, the ex-post safety net on maintaining the liquidity of liabilities. The obvious loose 
end was the lack of ex-ante internalization of systemic liquidity risk. Second, prudential 
regulation focused on the soundness of each institution under the assumption that the sum 
of sound institutions was equivalent to a sound system. However, as noted earlier, the 
Subprime crisis showed that this approach constituted a major fallacy of composition. It 
turned instead the approach on its head: the system is what matters most to the soundness 
of each institution.
56 Third, traditional regulation focused on statistically observable risks 
                                                 
56 Basel-style regulation rewarded those institutions that covered their risks with products and services 
offered by other institutions. Yet, the Subprime crisis showed those atomized protections to be not only 
irrelevant (they provided a false sense of security, unraveling when most needed) but possibly 
counterproductive as well (they exacerbated contagion and the risk of overall systemic failure). 
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and made much out of the sophisticated and complex risk modeling techniques that fed on 
these statistics. Yet, the Subprime crisis demonstrated that what you do not see is what will 
kill you (tail risks, black swans, and endogenous risk).
57 
 
Finally, consider the failures of dynamics. Basel-style regulation was essentially 
static. Norms were time invariant (cycle independent) and the mandated capital buffers 
were assumed to be sufficient to carry the system through the business cycle.
58 The 
Subprime crisis proved that approach wrong: static norms turned out to be pro-cyclical, too 
loose on the way up, too tight on the way down. Last but not least, Basel-style regulation 
failed to adequately incorporate the dynamic links between monetary and prudential 
policies. The central bank’s job adhered to ensuring macro stability and providing lender-
of-last-resort services, the supervisor’s to ensure financial prudency, and the two did not 
need to interact much. Yet, the insufficient attention of monetary authorities to the 
implications of their actions on financial developments, coupled with the insufficient 
attention of the supervisors to macro dynamics, deeply contributed to the crisis.
59 
 
A major problem when seeking to address these regulatory failures is that the best 
fix will most often depend on the paradigm. How one sees reform is thus essentially a 
function of the lens one uses. Table 2 synthesizes this discussion. The first questions in the 
table (under “foundations”) refer to the objectives of regulation. Although both the aims 
(reducing principal-agent frictions or internalizing social costs) and the means (see below) 
differ, the need to align incentives through ex-ante prudential norms is clear and 
uncontroversial under either the agency paradigm or the externalities paradigm. Instead, in 
the mood swings paradigm, the aim is to temper moods and maintain innovation under 
control. While there is no obvious inconsistency between the two, aligning incentives and 
tempering moods are clearly of a different nature. 
 
In either case, the key question as regards the respective roles of markets and 
supervisors in achieving the mentioned objectives of regulation is whether risk can be 
priced (which in turn largely depends on whether systemic crises can be avoided). The 
answer is “yes” in the agency paradigm. Anyone who has enough “skin” invested in his 
own game will have incentives to maintain risk taking within socially acceptable bounds. 
Similarly, anyone with enough skin invested in somebody else’s game (and this can also be 
mandated by regulation) will have an incentive to look for the earliest signs of 
malfeasance. Markets can thus deliver efficient signals and function as early smoke 
detectors. Once principal-agent problems are kept under control, systemic crises should not 
                                                 
57 While the regulatory framework has attempted to reduce the gap between risk and regulation (by upgrading 
from Basel I to Basel II), the Subprime crisis has brought into evidence severe issues of opacity, excessive 
complexity, and a misleading sense of control. See Tarullo (2008). 
58 Spanish regulators were the only ones in the developed world that explicitly dealt with cyclical dynamics 
by introducing the so-called “statistical provisions”—i.e., provisions that are built out of income during the 
upswing of the credit cycle and can be converted into specific provisions in the downward part of the cycle. 
This commendable approach was never embraced as part of the Basel creed, however.   
59 Borio (2003), Goodhart et al. (2004), Rajan (2005), and White (2006) were among the few providing early 
forewarnings of the dangers of this approach.  
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occur and historical statistics can become the bread-and-butter of day-to-day micro-
prudential risk management (i.e., help price risk across borrowers, institutions, and 
instruments). Accordingly, the main role of the agency supervisor is to put in place the 
necessary apparatus for markets to conduct their monitoring role effectively. Once this is 
done, his only residual role is one of compliance checking and crime policing 
(misrepresentation, fraud, looting, etc.) 
 
Table 2. A Synthetic Overview of Regulatory Issues and General Policy Responses 
  Paradigm 
Dimensions Issue  Agency Externalities  Mood  Swings 













What should ex-ante 
prudential norms do? 
Align incentives 













































Should the line in the 
sand be redefined?  No Yes  Not  necessarily 
Does fair value 
accounting help? 
Yes, it is 
fundamental 





Are systemic liquidity 
norms needed?  No  Perhaps Yes  Probably Yes  Focus 
How important to look 
at the system?  Not important  Very important  Fundamental 
Should prudential and 
monetary authorities 
coordinate? 





No Yes,  rule-based  Yes, judgment-
based 
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By contrast, the scope for spontaneous market help is marginal at best in the 
externalities paradigm, where the key dimension of risk is dynamic rather than cross 
sectional. It is likely to be socially too expensive to put in place fully crisis-proof 
prudential buffers. If so, risks of one hundred year floods (truly extraordinary events) will 
persist and markets can only help internalize externalities (i.e., provide systemic insurance) 
if they are able to calibrate the risks and costs of such events, and to withstand their strains. 
Neither is likely, however. For one thing, tail risks are unlikely to be estimated with 
precision, even when a sufficiently long statistical history is available. For another, given 
the contrast between the huge scale of a systemic crisis and its low probability, this is an 
aggravated case of catastrophe insurance. In view of the difficulties that the latter has 
faced, it is dubious that full-blown, market-based systemic insurance will see the light of 
day any time soon.
60 
 
The scope for market assistance is limited even further in the mood swings 
paradigm. As in the externalities paradigm, risk is systemic and dynamic. However, rather 
than tail risks that can be ultimately modeled, exceptional bumps ahead are more in the 
nature of “black swans” (observations that cannot be inferred from previous data series) or 
“endogenous risk” (risk endogenously created by market participants).
61 Hence, risk 
pricing becomes inherently difficult, not only because statistical history provides few clues 
as to what might be popping up ahead, but also because markets that are shaped by 
alternative bouts of euphoria and despair are unlikely to provide efficient, fundamentals-
based pricing signals. Thus, absent an effective oversight to prevent such financial system 
drifts (which, as argued below, will need to rely on greatly expanded supervisory skills and 
powers), Basel II’s aspiration to make regulation rest on internal risk management models, 
bolstered by risk-rating agencies and market valuations, crumbles. This aspiration 
presupposes that risk dominates uncertainty and markets are efficient, two premises that an 
unbridled mood swings paradigm debunks.
62  
 
The only scope for markets to play a role in the mood swings paradigm would be 
taking bets on whether the system as a whole is headed in the right direction or likely to 
crash. While a good case can be made that dedicated and well trained observers should be 
able to detect incoming icebergs through the fog, grasping how the system is wired and 
understanding the possible cracks is not an easy task. It is likely to require hefty 
investments and sophisticated skills. Hence, “systemic risk gazing” is unlikely to arise 
spontaneously as a profitable market activity. Instead, it should be viewed mostly as a 
public good.
63 Upgrading the role of the supervisor to provide or promote such “holistic 
                                                 
60 However, as proposed by Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2008), it might be feasible to set up private partial 
insurance schemes in the form of additional capital becoming available under stressful systemic events. We 
briefly come back to the issue of induced market discipline in the concluding section of the paper. 
61 See Danielsson and Shin (2002). 
62 De Grauwe (2008) and Haldane (2009) make closely related points. 
63 However, it might be possible to outsource part of the systemic monitoring activity through mandatory 
insurance arrangements. This issue is briefly revisited below. 
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monitoring” should therefore become a key component of reform. However, as discussed 
below, this will require, in addition to sound judgment and vision, sufficient independence 
and accountability—a tall order indeed.  
 
Consider next some of the key implications for the nature of prudential regulation. 
As regards the scope of regulation (the “line in the sand”), the discrepancies between the 
three sides are obvious. A supervisor grounded in the agency paradigm would insist that 
allowing unregulated intermediaries to operate freely is the proper thing to do. Informed 
investors will naturally migrate to the unregulated world where innovation can thrive, risks 
and returns will likely be higher, and—as long as information is timely and reliable—users 
of funds will be appropriately disciplined. However, for the reasons already noted above, 
his externalities colleague would be dead set against the idea of allowing prudentially 
unregulated intermediaries to operate side by side with the regulated sector. The mood 
swings supervisor would be of a more mixed mind. Unregulated intermediaries could make 
his life more difficult as uncontrolled innovation, pushed along by the forces of 
competition and regulatory arbitrage, could set eventually the system on the wrong track. 
However, provided all innovation is regulated, he might find this to be manageable. 
  
As regards the focus of regulation, the discrepancies across paradigms as regards 
the scope for market discipline have profound implications for the way risk is both 
reported and managed. Consider accounting issues first. In the agency paradigm, fair value 
accounting is clearly the superior alternative. Ensuring that changes in market values are 
immediately reflected in balance sheets is essential to contain the risk of a moral hazard-
driven bubble where undercapitalized intermediaries are allowed to continue operating 
normally. However, fair value accounting can be problematic under the other two 
paradigms. By enhancing the impact of one intermediary’s actions on the balance sheets of 
other intermediaries, it exacerbates externalities. At the same time, and perhaps more 
importantly, it magnifies the impact of liquidity or mood swing-induced deviations in asset 
prices from their longer run fundamentals.  
 
Consider risk management issues next. Are systemic liquidity norms needed? 
Clearly “no” under moral hazard (this is not a relevant problem), “perhaps” under 
externalities (as long as the ex-ante social benefits exceed the ex-ante social costs), and 
“probably yes” under mood swings. In the latter case, because crises are endogenous 
events rather than acts of god, they are likely to be more recurrent. Hence, unless the 
supervisor is convinced that he will be able to always navigate the ship around the 
icebergs, taking the proper systemic precautions is a good idea (multiple layers of steel 
against water inroads will better protect the keel).  
 
How important is it to look at the system as a whole? In the agency case, this is not 
the proper way to look at the problem. Systemic events arise from individual malfeasance 
and this is where the emphasis should stay. Instead, in the externalities paradigm, a 
systemic perspective is naturally called for. Indeed, this is exactly what one does when one 
“internalizes the externalities”. In the mood swings paradigm, the focus on the whole is 
perhaps even more fundamental. Crises are manifestations of collective excesses and it is 
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impossible to understand the dynamics of the whole by summing up the idiosyncratic risks 
and dynamic paths of individual institutions. 
 
In this context, the answer to the question “how tightly should the prudential and 
monetary authorities coordinate?” is rather self-evident. In the agency case, not much 
coordination is needed, if at all. Instead, the Greenspan doctrine seems to apply: let the 
prudential authority make sure that incentives are properly aligned and the monetary 
authorities make sure that the ship is sailing at the proper speed (i.e., take care of the 
cycle). In the externalities paradigm, the two authorities should instead closely consult 
each other to make sure that intermediaries are not unduly vulnerable to tail-risk events and 
that the supervisor is sufficiently aware of where the cycle might go. In the mood swings 
paradigm, there should be very tight coordination between the two authorities and possibly 
even no major differentiation between them. By contributing to mood swings, monetary 
policy becomes an integral part of the prudential story. And the prudential risks ahead 
become a key dimension of monetary policy decision making. Hence, prudential and 
monetary adjustments are joined at the hip. 
 
Along similar lines, are macro-prudential, dynamically adjusted norms needed? In 
the stationary moral hazard world, the answer is clearly negative. Instead, in the 
externalities paradigm, the exposure to exogenous shocks and fluctuations provides a good 
basis for cycle-adjusted norms because it allows prudential buffers to be real buffers, i.e., 
to be built up during the good times and used up during the bad times. In addition, these 
norms can help coordinate the actions of individual agents and thus overcome the 
prisoner’s dilemmas-type situations. Given that the externalities are known (or knowable); 
this militates in favor of rules over discretion. The mood swings paradigm also makes a 
strong case for anti-cyclical prudential norms but for a different reason. Rather than 
systematically limiting the ship’s speed under clear weather, the main motive in this case is 
to lift up the yellow flag when, under foggy weather, “icebergs may possibly be lying 
ahead”. Hence, mood swings provide a rationale for a judgment-based anti-cyclical 
framework, much as the one in effect for monetary policy—a framework where an 
independent body would have the discretion to calibrate the anti-cyclical prudential 
instrument in light of evolving circumstances. 
 
Consider finally the need for (and purpose of) a safety net (Table 3). To a large 
extent, this question relates to the scope for learning. In a system where learning is 
possible, it may be preferable to let agents face the hardships of financial crises and learn 
from experience.
64 In the agency paradigm the system is not dominated by uncertainty and 
mood swings and, hence, should be broadly stationary (even if subjected to innovation). 
Therefore, agents should eventually learn. This might take a few crises and significant 
bruises (which in turn require that the ex-post safety net not systematically validate the ex-
                                                 
64 The scope for learning is crucial for determining the need for any regulation, not just the safety net. Indeed, 
a good case can be made that even without a regulatory reform crises should convince principals 
(shareholders and investors) that they need to improve their control on agents (managers).  
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ante expectation of bailouts) but wisdom should eventually arise from the pain.
65 
Correspondingly, it would be better if the lender-of-last-resort (LOLR) function did not 
exist. Bank runs are healthy manifestations of market discipline. Stopping runs 
unnecessarily protects banks that should fail and aggravates the misalignment of incentives 
for all other banks. Similarly, deposit insurance can only be justified by consumer 
protection but, given its adverse moral hazard implications, a pure agency supervisor 
would probably conclude that, on balance, the world would be a better place without it.
66 
 
By contrast, in the externalities paradigm, the nature of the problem makes learning 
irrelevant. As long as externalities are not internalized, participants only see their side of 
the story, no matter what. Moreover, there is no possible learning from exogenous and 
random acts of god or from self-fulfilling runs in a multiple equilibrium world. Thus, to the 
extent that it is too expensive for society to prevent runs through large ex-ante buffer 
requirements, an efficient LOLR becomes a socially superior solution and the cornerstone 
of the regulatory edifice. Also, as his forebears after the Great Depression, an externalities 
supervisor would conclude that deposit insurance is needed to induce the small uninformed 
depositors to join the banking system while preventing them from crying wolf and causing 
systemic havoc without justification. Again, however, having fire safety only a 911 call 
away hardly promotes incentives for keeping a fire extinguisher at home, another good 
example of regulatory collision between the paradigms. 
 
Table 3.  The Need for A Safety Net 
  Paradigm 
Issue  Agency  Externalities  Mood Swings 
Can players learn 
on their own?  Probably Yes  No  Apparently not 
Is an ex-post LOLR 
needed? 
No, it is 
Counterproductive 
Yes, to provide 
systemic liquidity 
Yes, to absorb 
systemic risk 
Is a deposit 
insurance needed?  Probably not  Yes, to limit risks 
of “wrong” runs 
Yes, to limit 
impact of mood 
swings 
         
Interestingly, as regards the scope for learning, the mood swings paradigm lies 
somewhere in the middle. The constantly evolving environment makes some learning 
possible but tricky. One would think that agents should learn to be more cautious and 
eventually come to realize that, even if the scope for the truly new is constrained by path 
dependence, nasty surprises can emerge and that “not all that glitters is gold”. History has 
                                                 
65 The remaining question, of course, is whether such a system would be “fair” to the smaller and less 
educated consumers who might be scared away and remain forever on the fringes but in the end this is likely 
to be an issue of consumer protection more than systemic stability. 
66 Indeed, from a pure moral hazard perspective, the expansion of the safety net (particularly the creation of 
deposit insurance) can be seen as a mistaken knee-jerk reaction that has come back to haunt the current 
regulatory architecture and the goal should be to get rid of it. See for example Herring and Santomero (2000), 
Gale (2004), and Calomiris (2008). 
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amply demonstrated that this is not the case, however. Moreover, learning in this paradigm 
is somewhat of an oxymoron. Believing that one has finally “learned the lesson” can boost 
over-confidence in one’s ability to navigate through the obstacles, thereby setting in 
motion a mood swings-induced bubble. The uncertainty conscious supervisor would thus 
agree with his externalities colleague as to the core importance of the LOLR. However, as 
already noted, he would expect the LOLR mainly to absorb systemic risk rather than 
provide liquidity. Similarly, he would agree that a deposit insurance is needed to “calm 
down” the frayed nerves of investors when moods start to turn ugly. 
 
7.  Towards a New Regulatory Framework  
 
The discussion in the previous sections suggests that the design of a proper 
regulatory architecture faces two major challenges.
67 The first is to build a regulatory 
framework that takes into account all three paradigms and avoids solving problems in one 
paradigm at the cost of making matters sharply worse in another. The second challenge is 
to find an adequate balance between financial stability and financial development. Extreme 
solutions—a crisis-proof system that hardly intermediates or a thriving system that 
frequently collapses of its own weight—are of course to be avoided.  
 
A fully specified reform proposal that meets these challenges lies much beyond the 
scope of this paper (even more so since the devil is in the implementation details). There is 
however a minimum set of basic objectives that, in our view, any new prudential 
architecture should seek to fulfill, either because they cut across paradigms or they are 
absolutely central to one of the paradigms. Given the popularity of the agency paradigm, 
the reform agenda will likely be strong in addressing principal-agent issues (including 
through governance improvements, changes in management compensation schemes, and 
increased skin-in-the-game requirements). Hence, we focus in this section mainly on the 
objectives of the regulatory reform needed to address central issues under the externalities 
and mood swings paradigms.  
 
The first objective, which is particularly relevant to the externalities paradigm but 
applies to all, is full regulatory neutrality. If regulation is not applied uniformly, financial 
flows will sooner or later find the line of least resistance, giving unregulated financial 
institutions a competitive advantage and making them grow to the point where they 
become systemic behemoths. There are two possible solutions to this quandary. One is to 
make all financial intermediaries fit within the universal banking mode. This solution, 
however, would limit entry unduly and promote the preponderance of very large, too-big-
to-fail, financial conglomerates with limited creativity and large non-competitive rents. 
 
The alternative—which we find to be superior—is to maintain a distinction 
between commercial banks and other non-deposit taking financial intermediaries, but make 
                                                 
67 A number of important and detailed proposals to fix the regulatory framework have already seen the light 
of day. See for example Financial Stability Forum (2008), Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2008 a, 
and b, and 2009), Institute for International Finance (2008), Goldstein (2008), FSA (2009), and the 
November 2008 and April 2009 Declarations of the G-20 Summits.  
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the latter choose between being prudentially regulated or being unregulated. All regulated 
intermediaries would need to satisfy the same prudential requirements (capital adequacy in 
particular) as commercial banks and in exchange benefit from LOLR services.
68 However, 
reflecting their reduced responsibilities towards retail investors and the payment system, 
regulated non-bank intermediaries would be subject to a lower entry capital (i.e., the 
minimum capital needed to open) and less cumbersome fit-and-proper tests than those 
applicable to commercial banks (otherwise all non-bank intermediaries would become 
universal banks). The unregulated intermediaries, by contrast, would not need to satisfy 
capital adequacy requirements nor be subjected to an entry capital threshold. In exchange, 
however, they would be restricted to funding themselves only from regulated 
intermediaries, banks or non-banks (i.e., they could not borrow directly from—or acquire 
contingent liabilities with—the market).
69   
 
This proposal has many benefits. As in the case of universal banking, it would 
comply with regulatory neutrality. Because unregulated intermediaries could only fund 
themselves from regulated intermediaries, a dollar lent to a final borrower through an 
unregulated intermediary would end up paying the same capital charge (systemic tax) as a 
dollar lent through a regulated intermediary. Hence, systemic risk would be evenly 
internalized across all possible paths of financial intermediation, whether they involve 
regulated intermediaries or not.
70  
 
At the same time, in contrast with universal banking, the proposed scheme would 
favor innovation and competition. Because they would not need to meet any entry capital 
requirements, unregulated intermediaries could start from scratch. This would facilitate the 
entry of the smaller players, possibly into “niche” or “boutique” intermediation. The most 
innovative and successful would eventually grow to become regulated and gain direct 
access to the capital markets. In turn, the most successful of the regulated non-bank 
intermediaries could grow further to become universal banks, thereby authorized to tap 
                                                 
68 Following the same logic of regulatory neutrality, all asset-backed securities issued with some form of 
recourse (including reputational) to the regulated intermediary, or purchased by a regulated intermediary, 
should carry an equity tranche retained by the issuer at least equivalent to the uniform capital adequacy 
requirement imposed on the intermediation system.  
69 Thus, hedge funds that wish to remain unregulated would be allowed to borrow only from banks or other 
regulated intermediaries. In addition, they (as well as all other prudentially unregulated financial institutions) 
would not be permitted to engage as counterparties in credit derivatives transactions and other forms of 
default hedging and insurance (these give rise to contingent liabilities whose payment at the time they fall 
due may exert systemic stress by requiring asset fire sales). At the same time, a clear dividing line would also 
need to be established between financial and non-financial corporations, with the latter not being allowed to 
engage in finance operations beyond basic trade credit. 
70 Some regulatory bias between intermediated debt and direct debt issues would persist, since systemic risk 
would be internalized only in the former case. However, because it would not involve leveraged 
intermediation or expose financial intermediaries, this residual bias should be much less problematic and 
more manageable. Notice also that our proposal is only meant to address the systemic risks associated with 
debt-funded intermediation, but not those attached to unleveraged asset managers such as mutual funds, 
whose contribution to downward liquidity spirals is tempered (albeit not eliminated, particularly under 
conditions of structural or temporary asset market illiquidity) by the marking-to-market of their liabilities. 
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deposits and take on full payment system responsibilities.
71 The cost of oversight would 
remain low, however, as the activities of the unregulated would be monitored on a 
contractual basis by the regulated intermediaries that lend to them.
72 This would effectively 
“delegate” supervision to the regulated intermediaries, creating a two-tiered “nursery” 
system in which the start-ups could prosper and grow under the watchful eye of the better-
established (and more experienced) institutions.  
 
Most importantly, this proposal does not rely on artificial boundaries set up by the 
regulator between “systemically important” and “systemically unimportant” financial 
intermediaries, based on size, activity, or some risk-based measure of systemic impact 
(such as the recently proposed CoVar).
73 Such distinctions may promote regulatory 
arbitrage in ever more complex and opaque ways or be very difficult to implement.
74 
Instead, by treating all intermediaries equally subject only to a simple choice by the 
intermediary itself, our proposal is much simpler and operationally easier to implement.
75 
 
The second objective, particularly relevant to the externalities paradigm but also 
consistent with all three paradigms, is to keep the system reasonably close to a stable path 
(hence enhancing the scope for prices to reflect fundamentals) through a better alignment 
of incentives. In this regard, a key missing piece in the current framework is the 
internalization of systemic liquidity risk. Proposals have been made to penalize maturity 
mismatches between assets and liabilities. However, since short assets are likely to become 
as illiquid as long assets under systemic events, it seems preferable to focus on the 
maturity of the funding structure, irrespective of that of assets.
76 By inducing final 
                                                 
71 In this scheme, development banks could play a particularly important and relatively novel role. They 
could nurture innovation and promote competition and access by financing unregulated intermediaries and 
helping them grow. Their lower aversion to risk (supported by the State’s higher risk sharing capacity) would 
give them a natural edge over private regulated intermediaries.  
72 Kambhu, Schuermann, and Stiroh (2007) discuss the benefits (and limitations) of such indirect monitoring 
of hedge funds by regulated entities and conclude that it is a preferable alternative to direct regulation.  
73 See Brunnermeier et al. (2009). 
74 If the distinction is based on a simple objective criterion, such as size, unregulated intermediaries could 
multiply in numbers and engage in “systemic herding”. They would individually benefit from the lighter 
regulation by staying just below the size threshold but become just as systemically important as a whole as in 
the case where unregulated intermediaries of any size were allowed to operate. On the other hand, risk-based 
distinctions, even if based on meaningful and uncontested models (by no means an obvious proposition), 
could create grey zones with an uneven playing field as regards both the intensity of regulation and access to 
the safety net. Reclassifying institutions around the grey zones, in and out of the systemic list, could easily 
become an operational and political conundrum. 
75 Our proposal on the scope of prudential regulation only deals with pure market externalities. Hence, it does 
not address the too-big-to-fail or too-interconnected-to-fail problems. These problems do not invalidate our 
proposal but call for different instruments, particularly a suitable failure resolution framework—with powers 
to close, intervene, unwind positions, restructure, separate the “good” and “bad” parts of the balance sheet, 
etc.     
76 Penalizing maturity mismatches could encourage intermediaries to lend short. This would push liquidity 
risk on to borrowers but would not eliminate it from the system as it would increase the risk of defaults under 
systemic stress. Moreover, when several banks lend to the same borrower, it could encourage run-like loan 
recalls by banks that could further exacerbate systemic stress.  
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investors to hold at least part of the liquidity risk instead of pushing it on to the system, this 
should reduce systemic exposure to liquidity events. In any case, a liquidity-related norm 
would need to be properly calibrated to reflect social costs and benefits, could take 
alternative forms (e.g., a special capital charge, a risk-adjusted insurance premium), and 
would need to reconcile the pro-cyclicality of nearly any norm based on contemporaneous 
risk with the need for counter-cyclical adjustments.
77  None of the above is trivial.
78 
 
The third (and closely related) objective is to continue improving the safety net, 
reflecting its centrality to the externalities and mood swings paradigms. (Even with vigilant 
supervision and sufficient internalization of externalities, the high social costs of crisis-
proof systems and the uncertain turns taken by continually evolving financial systems 
render the full elimination of crisis a socially undesirable endeavor.) The objective of 
improving the safety net calls for: (i) reviewing the pricing of deposit insurance schemes to 
better reflect their de facto systemic exposure; (ii) examining whether access to the LOLR 
should be paired with a systemic insurance that all prudentially regulated intermediaries 
(whether deposit-taking or not) should subscribe to; and (iii) rethinking the LOLR from a 
mood swings perspective, i.e., as a risk absorber of last resort. As noted, under our 
proposal for the scope of prudential regulation, all regulated intermediaries would have 
equal access to the LOLR. In contrast, unregulated intermediaries would be allowed to fail 
under an efficient bankruptcy code (this would allow the less successful intermediaries to 
exit promptly, thereby maintaining the vitality of the system). 
 
The fourth objective relates to the importance of keeping a tighter rein on the 
possible downstream risks of financial innovation, particularly (but not only) from a mood 
swings perspective. This would require giving the regulator more powers to regulate, 
standardize, and authorize all forms of innovation (whether in instruments, institutions, or 
markets) and to subject them to much more rigorous pre-approval and road-testing, much 
as in the case of new drugs for the FDA.
79 
 
The fifth objective is realigning the respective monitoring roles of markets and 
supervisors to address the underlying weaknesses of spontaneous market discipline under 
both the externalities and mood swings paradigms. Markets should no doubt continue to 
play a key ex-ante role in allocating resources and helping align incentives in the agency 
paradigm. However, it would be foolish to expect spontaneous market discipline to prevent 
                                                 
77 The challenge for counter-cyclical norms largely stems from the fact that the direction towards which 
incentives need to be aligned (and moods tempered) shifts abruptly depending on the phase of the cycle: 
dampening the upward phase requires that intermediaries take less risk and accumulate more capital; 
dampening the downward phase requires that intermediaries take more risk and use up capital.   
78 Additional ways to better internalize systemic liquidity risk might also include limits on gross leverage, an 
in-depth review of the differentiated capital requirements on trading books versus banking books, and some 
form of liquidity buffer (i.e., a prudential norm encouraging the holding of systemically safe assets). On the 
latter, see Morris and Shin (2008). 
79 A very similar recommendation can be found in Buiter (2008). By the same token, the tight linkages 
between financial innovation and deregulation also call for special attention to the potentially destabilizing 
market implications of regulatory reform (unduly exuberance or moral hazard-induced dynamics).  
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externality- or mood swings-induced systemic crises. Moreover, imposing market 




By contrast, in the multi-paradigm world, the supervisor would be naturally 
expected to have such a tough and complex responsibility that reasonable doubts exist as to 
whether its implementation lies in the feasible range. Unlike in the pure agency paradigm, 
he can no longer relax and concentrate on relatively simpler policing tasks once he has 
built the necessary informational and contractual environment to promote market discipline 
(hence, self-regulation). Instead, the “holistic” supervisor of the mood swings paradigm 
provides a valuable scouting, moderating, and coordination service to society that markets 
cannot spontaneously provide. To this end, he should be able to connect the dots, 
understand the forest beyond the trees, and look ahead for possible systemic trouble. He 
would need the means and the clout to help coordinate expectations around systemically 
sustainable paths. This in turn calls for a deeper informational role—i.e., to provide 
systemically oriented information and benchmarks to help intermediaries think 
systemically and fashion their risk assessments accordingly.  
 
However, in a world of bounded rationality and sentiment-driven noise traders, 
information and analysis are unlikely to suffice. Adding deeds to words will require 
boosting the supervisor’s capacity (and skills) to exert judgment-based discretionary 
interventions to slow down credit cycles, or restrict specific forms of intermediation that 
may become riskier as they develop. Given evolutionary uncertainty, macro-prudential 
regulation cannot be entirely rule-based. Instead, counter-cyclical prudential norms may 
have to be at least in part judgment-based, calibrated discretionally in view of changing 
circumstances, much as the interest rate is calibrated by monetary authorities.
81 Of course, 
what shape and form such an instrument could take is hardly a trivial issue. 
 
The stronger powers of the “holistic” supervisor would also be accompanied by a 
tougher responsibility and, with it, a risk of calamitous failure. If things go well, financial 
market participants will reap the benefits and the supervisor would be an unsung hero. If 
things go wrong, moral hazard will have a field day: “it was the regulator’s fault, hence the 
state’s responsibility to pay for damages.” Moreover, initial success in stirring the system 
may breed complacency and irrational exuberance leading to a crash down the line. 
Avoiding these pitfalls will require combining hard-wired rules (that maintain the system 
within reasonable bounds) with an institutional reform that is commensurate with the 
supervisor’s new terms of reference (including his enhanced powers and responsibilities), 
and sufficiently strong to overcome the multiple difficulties associated with the use of 
discretion. Finding the right implementation modalities and regulatory mix between rules 
                                                 
80 The failure of Lehman Brothers provides a vivid recent illustration of the risks attached to 11
th hour 
attempts to limit moral hazard by restricting access to the safety net. 
81 Indeed, reflecting more tenuous and complex links between the instrument and the final objective, a pure 
rule-based macro-prudential policy could be even more elusive than a pure Taylor rule-based monetary 
policy. Instead, having to explain and justify decisions could help promote progress on macro-systemic 
prudential analysis, much as has been the case with inflation targeting for monetary policy.  
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and discretion is likely to be one of the toughest yet most central challenges of prudential 
regulatory reform in the years ahead.
82 
 
A key additional question to be tackled in the years ahead is whether the 
supervisor’s task might be eased through an expansion of induced market discipline. In 
effect, policy initiatives could create incentives for private participants to provide some 
form of insurance against systemic risks and this might further the supervisor’s capacity to 
look ahead and facilitate his use of discretion.
83 However, whether it will be possible in 
practice to reliably outsource systemic monitoring in a cost-efficient manner to the private 
sector is a widely open question at this stage. 
 
                                                 
82 In this context, to avoid regulatory capture, a particularly hard look will need to be given to the political 
economy of regulation (see Demirguc-Kunt and Serven, 2009). This problem can become trickier when the 
supervisor needs to round off his views partly based on those who are closer to the market, including 
financial intermediaries. At the same time, however, players should realize that systemic adjustments should 
affect all players equally (provided regulation is truly neutral) and are for the common good, which should 
ease the way for fruitful coordination, much as in the case of monetary policy.    
83 In view of the large risks involved and the private sector’s higher risk aversion, such policy initiatives may 
require some risk sharing between the public and private sectors. 
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